The Pix Case Exposes Europe’s Dependence on Foreign Payment Networks
This week, the standoff between Washington and Brasília pushed payments beyond the fintech pages. Pix, Brazil’s instant payment system, is now part of a trade dispute that has led the United States to impose new tariffs on Brazil.
For Europe, which remains heavily dependent on international card networks, the warning is clear: payment infrastructure is not merely a commodity. It is a critical strategic issue.
For a long time, payment sovereignty remained a topic for specialists. For the general public, paying was seen as a neutral act: a card, a phone, a click.
The Pix case has shattered that illusion.
The Brazilian system has not been targeted by the United States because of an outage, a security flaw or a scandal. It is being targeted because it works and has captured Brazil’s domestic market. But also because its success has reduced the role of US companies in everyday payments.
Pix: a success made in Brazil
Launched in November 2020 by the Central Bank of Brazil, Pix allows users to send and receive money within seconds, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Payments can be initiated using a QR code, a phone number, an email address or a Pix key.
Banks are required to offer the service, and its use is free for individuals. From a technological perspective, payments do not travel through card networks. They are processed as account-to-account transfers.
The Central Bank created the infrastructure, established the rules and allowed financial institutions to develop the interfaces and services around it. Within five years, Pix became part of everyday life. By the end of 2025, the Central Bank of Brazil reported more than 170 million users in a country where millions of people had previously been unbanked or underbanked.
This success has redirected transaction volumes that previously relied on cash and cards. Ultimately, both consumers and merchants benefit: fewer intermediaries, lower fees and less data captured by international networks.
This is precisely where the issue becomes geopolitical.
Washington turns Pix into a trade issue
In June 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) argued that Brazil was favouring its “national champion”. Washington notably criticised the Central Bank for acting simultaneously as the regulator, owner and operator of Pix.
On 15 July 2026, Washington ultimately decided to impose 25% tariffs on some Brazilian imports. Pix is not the sole reason for these measures, but it is among the practices cited by the US administration.
A domestic payment system can now be treated as a trade barrier.
The implicit message is stark: if a national infrastructure significantly reduces the role of US operators, trade policy instruments may be used against it.
Brazil is the target today, but every country developing—or considering developing—a domestic payment system has received the warning.
Europe: payment sovereignty remains incomplete
Europe has the euro, a powerful central bank and a market of nearly 350 million people within the euro area. Yet it still lacks a European solution capable of covering all everyday digital payments across the region.
This dependency can be measured. According to the ECB, the international Visa and Mastercard networks account for approximately two-thirds of card transactions in the euro area. Thirteen countries do not even have a domestic card network. Where a national network does exist, such as CB in France, it often relies on international co-badging with Visa or Mastercard to operate abroad.
Europe’s dependency allows these companies to collect significant fees. More importantly, it gives them access to payment data and creates business continuity risks in a world where international relations are becoming increasingly strained.
Two responses are now emerging to strengthen payment sovereignty in Europe: one from commercial banks through Wero, and another from the public sector through the digital euro proposed by the ECB.
Act 1 / Wero: the response from European commercial banks
Wero is the European private sector’s main response. The wallet was launched by the European Payments Initiative (EPI), a consortium of European banks.
Its technology breaks with the traditional card model. Wero is built on SEPA instant payments. Money is transferred directly from the payer’s bank account to the beneficiary’s within seconds, without going through card network infrastructure.
Its rollout began in 2024 with person-to-person payments in France, Germany and then Belgium. EPI recently reported more than 47 million users.
But payments between friends are only the first step. The decisive battle will take place at merchants and is expected to begin at the end of 2026.
This enormous undertaking is as much commercial as it is technological. Europe has already seen several promising projects disappear after failing to expand beyond national borders or bring together enough banks to achieve critical scale.
Act 2 / The digital euro: public infrastructure for everyday payments
Europe’s other response comes from the public sector. The digital euro is a digital form of central bank money, just as banknotes are a form of public money today.
The project is being led by the Eurosystem and the ECB. The objective is not to create a European cryptocurrency, but to make public money usable online. The digital euro is designed for payments between individuals and at merchants. It will be distributed to users by banks and payment service providers.
The Eurosystem aims to be technically ready for a potential issuance in 2029, subject to the adoption of the legislative framework. The project is progressing, with a Europe-wide pilot due to begin in 2027.
Payment sovereignty: the geopolitical battle of the coming years
Systems such as Pix in Brazil, UPI in India, Wero and the digital euro in Europe do not share the same architecture or governance model. But they have one major feature in common: they prevent domestic payments from depending entirely on a limited number of foreign players.
The Pix case marks a turning point. It shows that payment infrastructure can become a target in trade negotiations. It also demonstrates that the United States is prepared to defend its digital interests using instruments that extend far beyond financial regulation.
Europe must draw a simple conclusion: it cannot wait for the next crisis before building sovereign, high-performing payment infrastructure. It must turn projects such as Wero and the digital euro into industrial successes.